Wednesday 29 April, 2026

Tēnā koe Minister,

We write as members of the forced migration sector, including those with lived experience of displacement, practitioners, civil society organisations, and academics, regarding the Immigration (Enhanced Risk Management) Amendment Bill.

We oppose this Bill in its current form.

We acknowledge the intent to support an effective and credible immigration system. However, we consider that the cumulative effect of the proposed changes raises significant concerns for visa holders, especially asylum seekers, as well as for the broader refugee protection framework in Aotearoa New Zealand. For the reasons set out below, we are united in opposing the Bill in its current form.

1. Process and evidential basis

The process underpinning the Bill warrants attention. Across the Regulatory Impact Statements (RIS), there are repeated acknowledgements of compressed timeframes, absence of public consultation (including none with “migrants or representatives of migrants” [p.6], and analysis that only partially meet quality assurance standards. In some instances, the policy rationale is explicitly informed by a small number of “edge cases” (p. 4) or is based upon “limited and imperfect data” (p. 7), with little ability to model wider system impacts. Taken together, these shortcomings raise questions about whether the evidential base and consultation process are proportionate to the scale and significance of the proposed changes.

2. Changes to asylum claim pathways (clause 11 re. section 150)

Second, the proposed amendment to section 150, treating withdrawal of an asylum claim as equivalent to a declined claim, risks reducing flexibility for individuals navigating complex and often uncertain circumstances. Sector experience indicates this will affect a small but genuine cohort, including individuals who may otherwise be able to regularise their status through employment or family pathways. The likely effect is to prolong claims or leave people without a lawful pathway to remain.

In addition, proposed changes to section 150 lack an evidence base: MBIE’s own RIS notes minimal impact (only 68 of 330 withdrawn claimants applied for another visa), acknowledges it has no data distinguishing unmeritorious from genuine withdrawn claims, and records that both officials and the immigration refugee bar did not support the Minister’s preferred option. The RIS further shows that MBIE’s advice did not align with the Cabinet proposal, which suggests a political rationale rather than a sound basis for legislation affecting protection claims.

3. Limitation of humanitarian appeal rights (e.g., clauses 12, 15, 22)

Third, the proposed narrowing of humanitarian appeal rights reduces access to independent oversight at a critical point in the system. Such mechanisms are an important safeguard, particularly for individuals with complex or evolving protection humanitarian needs, including those facing serious harm and persecution if returned. In addition, no mechanism is mentioned for monitoring the well-being of returnees. Furthermore, removing the right to appeal to the Tribunal without creating a viable alternative may create new pressure points in the system, such as by shifting claims to the High Court or to the Office of the Ombudsman.

Limiting appeal rights could also be unduly harsh on the children of those liable for deportation. Currently, many deportation cases regarding temporary visa holders involve families with children in school who have spent the majority of their lives in Aotearoa New Zealand. Deportation can have major, adverse impacts on children’s health and well-being, notably through family separation, disrupted education, and being returned to an unfamiliar country where they may not speak the language. Retaining the right to appeal deportation is an important avenue for protecting children’s rights and upholding New Zealand’s obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, a concern also noted by the Immigration Protection Tribunal in the RIS.

4. Expanded powers to request identification (clause 26)

Fourth, the proposed expansion of powers to request identification for suspected deportation liability and breaches of visa conditions raises significant equity concerns. A Cabinet paper (para. 44) on the Bill acknowledges that Pacific peoples will be disproportionately impacted owing to their overrepresentation in overstaying statistics, a finding that warrants serious weight. In practice, these powers are likely to extend to other racialised communities, including asylum seekers, many of whom have experienced heightened and harmful government monitoring in their countries of origin. Rather than fostering a sense of safety and belonging, these provisions risk undermining belonging, compounding existing vulnerabilities, and eroding trust in public institutions.

As drafted, the provision extends enforcement powers without sufficient guidance or safeguards. Of particular concern is the introduction of the terms “may be” and “may have” alongside the inclusion of suspected breaches of visa conditions in clause 26. Together, these changes create overly broad discretion, increasing the risk of inconsistent and unmeritorious inspections.

Finally, consistent with Te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations concerning governance and active protection, the broader implications of the provisions should be assessed through a Tiriti lens.

5. “Bad faith” and procedural policy provisions

Fifth, policy provisions relating to “bad faith” and procedural compliance are broadly framed and create significant uncertainty in how they will be applied. There is a real risk that procedural issues may unduly influence the assessment of substantive protection claims, particularly given the structural barriers asylum seekers face in engaging with legal processes. For example, Refugee and Protection officers may perceive a meritorious claimant as acting in bad faith where that claimant’s presentation is in fact shaped by past trauma, language barriers, memory loss, or lack of legal representation.

Taken together, these changes signal a shift in emphasis toward risk mitigation and control. While these are legitimate objectives, we consider that, in their current form, the proposals do not strike an appropriate balance with New Zealand’s longstanding commitment to refugee protection, fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles.

We oppose this bill in its current form. While we recognise the stated intent to strengthen aspects of the immigration system, the provisions relating to asylum and humanitarian appeals raise substantive concerns regarding procedural fairness, access to protection, and the integrity of decision-making processes. Should this legislation be passed despite the serious concerns raised, we recommend that the Government make amendments as follows:

• Undertake further targeted consultation and evidence-gathering before progressing key asylum- and humanitarian appeal-related provisions, particularly given the acknowledged reliance on limited data, “edge cases,” and analysis that only partially meets quality assurance standards;
• Remove the proposed amendment to section 150, to ensure it does not create unintended barriers to lawful status resolution or prolong asylum processes;
• Retain access to independent humanitarian appeal mechanisms as a core safeguard within the system;
• Remove the provision (clause 26) that expands officials’ powers to ask for identification or biographical information.
• Clarify and limit the application of “bad faith” provisions to ensure that procedural issues do not undermine the substantive assessment of protection claims, giving careful consideration to the impacts of past trauma, language barriers, memory loss, lack of legal representation, and other contributing factors.

These steps would help ensure that the Bill maintains public confidence while remaining proportionate, evidence-based, and consistent with New Zealand’s humanitarian commitments.

We welcome continued engagement on these issues.

Ngā manaakitanga,